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Abstract  
Assessing whether distributional changes are “pro-poor” has become increasingly 
widespread in academic and policy circles. Based on the methodology of Ravallion 
and Chen (2003), Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003) 
using grouped data, the paper generates three indices to test whether distributional 
changes were indeed pro-poor during the period (1990-2008). Another issue is 
whether pro-poor judgments should be correlative with the size of the middle class. 
The paper presents the evolution of middle class in Egypt using different thresholds.   
The middle class in Egypt has followed the path of bulging in size under a certain 
threshold even if growth was not pro-poor growth. 
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ntroductionI 
The change that swept the Arab region unleashed new horizons of thinking, 
especially when the people who led the revolutions were not  from the poor class,  
but came from  the middle class, who Birdsall (2011) called “the catalyst middle 
class.” Nevertheless, the MENA region has the largest proportion of the population 
which can be considered a middle class among the six regions; it increased from   
75.5 percent of the population in 1990, to 78.7 percent in 2005, according to 
Ravallion (2010). The political uprising which was sparked by what conventionally is   
considered  a middle class citizen (Bouazizi from Tunisia) urges a thinking of what lies 
under the surface of income lines, especially in countries that have achieved 
considerably rapid economic growth (Egypt & Tunisia).   
On one hand, the appearance of a strong middle class in Egypt, according to the 
absolute threshold which represents about 85% of population in 2008 using 
Ravallion's  thresholds, contrasts with the volatility of economic performance in the 
last two decades. While the relative threshold may delineate another view of a 
shrinking middle class, it presents about 43% of population by following Easterly 
(2001) and Zero middle class according Birdsall (2010). Sizing the population position 
between the national poverty line and the median may shed a light on a class many 
called middle class by crossing the lower threshold, but they are the most vulnerable 
to poverty traps. Birdsall (2013) described them as "New Strugglers.”  
One the other hand, economic growth is not the only driver of the increase in the 
size of the middle class (MC), the initial levels of income inequality also influence the 
extent to which the size of MC responds to economic growth. The interplay between 
the three elements of poverty, inequality and growth has a great influence on the 
size of the middle class, and these three elements constitute the essence of pro-poor 
growth policy. Recently, Egypt has adopted an inclusive growth concept which 
intends to achieve a pro-poor growth target in absolute terms, by making poverty 
reduction a priority and moving the poor to a new class. That would urge a further 
query regarding where those who departure poverty zone are moving to. This class 
that those who depart poverty are moving to is conventionally defined as neither 
poor nor rich, but “middle class” (Birdsall, 2007). 
The study raises questions regarding the evolution of middle class size in Egypt. 
Which thresholds could be more proper to capture the real size of the MC in the 
income distribution ladder? Was growth pro-poor in Egypt?  
The study contributes to the literature of measuring pro-poor growth (PPG) beyond 
the growth incidence curve. It generates the three main PPG indices; the Ravallion 
and Chen index (2003), Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003) and Kakwani and Pernia 
pro‐poor index (2000). The main results show that growth was pro-poor during the 
two sub-periods periods (1990-1995) & (2004-2008). This drastic increase of the size 
of the MC, even when growth is not pro-poor, contradicts with the interplay factors 
of pro-poor growth; growth, poverty and inequality.  
The rest of paper is structured as follows; Section two provides a review of the 
definitions of middle class, a regional comparison, the evolution of MC size in Egypt 
and a proposed median threshold. Section three presents the main indices of pro-
poor growth. Finally, the paper ends with the conclusion.  
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and measurementMiddle class between definition  Section Two: 
    
   By 2030, two billion new people may join the world middle class (Wilson & 
Dragusanu, 2008). Some narratives argue that the next decades will witness major 
economic changes, as spending power shifts towards middle-income economies and 
away from rich countries. Especially with the rise of (BRICs), the high growth rates of 
China and India have played an important role in producing the middle-income bulge 
in the developing world as a whole, China alone accounts for half of the 1.2 billion 
new entrants to the middle-class over 1990-2005 according to Ravallion (2009). 
In 2011, Branko Milanovic estimated that in the mid-nineteenth century, about half 
of global inequality could be accounted for by unequal incomes within countries and 
the other half to inequalities in average incomes across countries. Today the split is 
80 percent in favor of cross-country income differences, with only 20 percent of 
global inequality accounted for by income differences within countries, which means 
that the global middle class has been reshaped dramatically, and that any shrinking 
of the size of the middle class means fighting against a rising tide of inequality.  
Recent studies by Homi and Gerts (2010), Birdsall (2010) and Ali, A.A.G. (2010) have 
shed light on the middle class and its essential role in promoting world consumption. 
Especially after the latest world financial crisis and the downturn of the global 
economy, the middle class' role became a focus point to retrieve the balance of the 
world economy. Until the time of writing this paper, the definition of middle class is 
still hotly debatable; there is certainly no consensus among development economists 
on the definition of the income thresholds of the middle class in developing 
countries, where the main way for the middle class to expand is probably through 
poverty reduction. The middle class differs from place to place from one economy to 
another, and the standard of living of a person classified as ‘middle class” depends 
on the average level of income of the country, so in a low income country the middle 
class may correspond to the poor in a high-income economy.  
 
The problem starts with defining who we are talking about 
Adam Smith’s definition of classes is based on the objective position of the 
individuals who constitute them in economic life. In other words, the objective class 
is considered to be a consequence of his or her specific economic function. Smith 
presented the classical school where classes were categorized into three groups; the 
capitalists (owners of the means of production), who gain profit as income; the 
workers who gain wages as income; and the land-owners, who gain rent as income 
(from the renting of their fields to the capitalist-farmers). John Stuart Mill extended 
the principle of “friendly merger” to examine how non-economic parameters like 
government, traditions or custom influence the class structure of society. Yet, the 
definition of middle class swings between economic and social approaches. 
 
From the sociological approach there are two main theories. The first one is based 
on theory derived from the works of Karl Marx, and the other from Max Weber. The 
Marxian social class distinctions do not refer to types of occupation or levels of 
income but on the form of physical and capital endowments that each social group 
possess. Marx called the existence of a small, independent group of businessmen 
and professionals who acquired skills, knowledge, and education to rely only on 
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them to achieve a better economic position as the petty bourgeoisie. Weberians 
define social classes through inequalities in income, educational attainment, power 
and occupational prestige. Class in his terms, is the way economic power is 
distributed when economic action is organized to the greatest degree of rational 
manner. So class was bound to the production of goods, while the status of any 
group was stratified according to their consumption of goods and “style of life.” 
Other social views, like those of GoldThorpe and Mcknight (2006), adopt an 
employment-based class position in depending an individual’s economic security and 
economic stability. Wright (2005) conceives of classes as being a structured 
mechanism of domination and exploitation in which economic positions accord 
some people power over the lives and activities of others.  
Yet, income is still a tempting criterion for choosing income thresholds. It is easy to 
determine that whoever is below the lower threshold is “poor,” whoever is above 
the higher one is “rich” and that in between each threshold is the middle class. 
Nevertheless, a purely economic point of view to define and calculate the middle 
class fluctuates depending on the purpose of the calculations and its relation with 
other factors; growth, democracy, political issues, etc. These differences are also due 
to the changing nature of the fundamentally used tools of calculation (poverty line, 
median, and the mean income). Also it’s noticeable that there are three dominant 
approaches to measurement; the absolute, relative and hybrid approaches. The 
choice between these various approaches depends on the purpose at hand. 
  
The Income-based absolute approach assumes a fixed income threshold (PPP 
adjusted) which raises a lot of arbitrary views, in addition to the heterogeneity of 
different countries’ development levels. Among absolute measures Milanovic and 
Yitzhaki’s study (2002) about decomposing the world distribution for 114 countries 
into three groups, which used households surveys, came out with a shocking result 
that only 11% of the world are middle class, by using the definition of the middle 
class as those living between the mean incomes of Brazil and Italy, which translates 
into roughly $12-$50 a day per person at 2000 (PPP). This aligns with the same 
absolute stream that the World Bank (2007) uses to define the global middle class, 
as their per capita income thresholds are approximately equal to $4,000 and 
$17,000. According to this definition many of the relatively rich in developing 
countries are in the global middle class, while the vast majority of the absolutely rich 
(per capita incomes above $17,000) live in OECD countries. In the context of the 
debate about the role of China’s consumption in the global economy, Homi & Gerts 
(2010) pushed for an absolute measure. They sensed that the distinctive role of the 
middle class, especially the American middle class, declines after the global 
economic turmoil in mid-2008. They urge that China could be the potential middle 
class substitute, where the middle class has been expanding exponentially. They 
define the middle class as households with daily expenditures between $10 and 
$100 per person in PPP terms. The lower bound was chosen with reference to the 
average poverty line in Portugal and Italy, while the upper line was chosen as twice 
the median income of Luxemburg. By applying this methodology for 145 countries, 
they ascertained that the world is in the throes of a major expansion in the middle 
class, most of it will come from Asia, particularly from China. By 2020 China could be 
topping global consumption to become the largest single middle class market by 
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2020 (13%), surpassing the United States. Noting the need to accelerate China’s 
transformation towards a domestic consumption-led growth pattern, eventually the 
global middle class would shift from West to East.  
From a pro-poor growth perspective, Birdsall (2010) took a wider focus on the 
grounds that the middle class is a merely simple extension of caring about the poor, 
and emphasizing more sound and inclusive growth policies that enable the increase 
in the proportion of middle class, and consequently the proportion of total income 
that they command. Birdsall rejects the idea that anyone who escapes from the 
poverty line of just $2 a day is a member of middle class, as this would never be a 
reasonable level of economic security. Based on this concept, the lower bound 
would be $10 a day (in 2005 purchasing power terms) as the minimum income for a 
person to have the economic security in today’s global economy, while the upper 
bound is determined to be at or below the 95th percentile of the income distribution 
in their home country. Yet, $10 per day is low compared to the national poverty lines 
of OECD countries where poverty lines are defined in relative terms. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2007) define the middle class as those whose daily per capita consumption is 
between $2 and $4 or between $6 and $10, and argue that the middle class person is 
not an entrepreneur in waiting, although they might run a business that is usually 
small not very profitable. Having a steady well paid job is the key for better 
education and health care that might lead them to build their own careers. In a 
recent study López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011) also proposed absolute thresholds 
and looked for an income value that corresponds to a minimum requirement that 
defines the middle-class.  The authors followed a regression-based approach which 
exploits panel data to estimate the amount of comparable income which depicts the 
beginning of the middle class (lower threshold) –$10 dollars a day, associated with a 
low (0.10) probability of falling into poverty. They find the upper threshold to be $50 
dollars a day. Moving to relative income-based definitions, which mostly relies on 
the median–suffers from the problem of different medians in each country which 
means different middle classes from one country to the other. 
Birdsall et al. (2000) pushed to define the middle class as those with incomes 
between 75% and 125% of the median in each country. Easterly (2001) defines the 
“middle class” as those lying between the 20th and 80th percentile on the 
consumption distribution, and finds evidence that a larger income share controlled 
by the middle three quintiles promotes economic growth. In fact the study has 
shown, based on cross country and panel econometric regression, that a higher 
share of incomes for the middle class is empirically associated with higher growth, 
more education and other favorable development outcomes. Ravallion (2009) 
adopts a hybrid approach; it could be absolute in application but might be relative in 
essence. The developing world’s middle class is introduced as those who are not 
deemed “poor” by the standards of developing countries, but are still poor by the 
standards of rich countries. Ravallion sets the lower bound at $2 a day at 2005 PPP 
(The median of 70 national poverty lines), and the upper bound at $13 a day (the 
USA poverty line). Ravallion showed that the developing world’s middle class 
increased from 32.8 percent of the population in 1990 to 48.5 percent of the 
population in 2005. These figures suggest that more than 1.2 billion people joined 
the middle class over 1990–2005, with China accounting for a startling half of this 
amount. Blackburn and Bloom (1985) identify the middle class as households with 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 16, No. 1, May 2014 
 
48 
 
per capita income between 0.60 and 2.25 times the median income in the United 
States. Davis and Huston (1992) use a narrower range: between 0.50 and 1.50 times 
the median, also for the United States. Graham and Pettinato (2000) use a range 
between 0.75 and 1.25 times the median for 30 countries, including high-income, 
transition, and Latin American economies. 
Other studies rely on the group position in the income distribution as a determinant 
of the middle class size, which could be more likely to quantify the income share of 
the middle class. For example; Alesina and Perotti (1996) use the income share of 
the third and fourth quintiles of the distribution; Partridge (1997) uses the middle 
quintile; Barro (1999) uses the middle three quintiles; and Solimano (2008), the third 
to ninth deciles. 
   
Despite a persistent emphasis on the importance of having a large middle class for 
economic growth, its consumption patterns its propensity to accumulate human and 
physical capital, or for democracy and political stability, as of yet no pure analytical 
income characterization has been satisfactory. More digging is needed to capture a 
comprehensive picture of this group. 
 
regional a  –Arab World  the middle class inthe The size of 2.1 
ncompariso 
Not only are the poverty lines deceptive in the Arab region, the measurement of the 
middle class is quite deceptive as well. At any value lower than $1.25, the Arab 
region displays very low poverty rates of about 25% in (2000-2009). However, rates 
jump sharply with a higher poverty line. At a poverty line of approximately $3 a day, 
the rate of the Arab region is far closer to that of the average of all developing 
regions (65%) for the same period. Similarly, for the measurement of the MC, as 
shown in table 1, the middle class of the Arab region1 is considerably higher at 
absolute cutoffs, and by Ravallion 's thresholds it is even higher than other regions, 
and reaches about 79%  and  80% by the ADP2 lines ($20-$2). By comparison, using 
Homi's cutoffs it constitutes only 5 % of the population. But this aggregate picture 
hides more than it reveals, income measured by GDP per capita increased at an 
average of 2 percent annually in Arab countries during the 1990s and 2000s, while 
per capita growth of household final consumption expenditure was only 1.3 percent, 
which indicates that growth has not translated into higher incomes or household 
expenditures for the majority of people in these regions, especially the middle class 
that supported the poor to form a new coalition. Roughly speaking, there is a new 
middle class market not only according to the income-based threshold, but the 
recent political situation drew attention to this class, which would require the need 
to investigate the composition rather than the size of the MC. 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
 Arab Region ; Djibouti, Mauritania, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Sudan, Palestine  
 
2
 Asian Development Bank  
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Table (1) Middle Class growth in Developing Countries - Regional Comparison  
Author's calculation based on UNESCWA "middle class in Arab region report 2014 "forthcoming .The calculations 
are based on data of   67 developing countries . 
 
2.2 The Middle Class in Egypt 
Why was the revolution initiated by secular middle class youth, who are supposed to 
be the beneficiaries of the modernizing republics? Why was this deep feeling of 
dissatisfaction so easily spread among the whole class? The next section will try to 
find answers to these questions through three methods. First, it will take a quick 
glance at Egyptian economic performance from both the aspects of both poverty and 
inequality, then it will look at the size of the MC at different cutoffs and measure the 
wealth index during the last two decades, and, finally, it will look at the median 
approach as a simple and understandable threshold of the middle class in Egypt. 
  
The importance of  the household sector in the Egyptian Economy  
 
Before presenting inequality and poverty trends, it's important to investigate the 
household share of GDP during the last decade, which reveals that it constitutes 
about two-third of total GDP compared to the other three sectors. 
 
 
Region    (0.75-1.25) 
median 
($13-$2) ($20-$2) ($13- Ho 
_NPL )  
(90th- 
Ho_NPL ) 
($100-$10) 
Arab Countries          
  1990s 32.4 64 65.6 66.5 59.8 3.9 
  2000s 37.1 78.6 80.2 77.5 70 4.1 
  Change % 14.5 22.8 22.3 16.5 17.1 5.1 
East Asia & Pacific          
  1990s 36.4 33.7 33.9 39.7 78.1 0.6 
  2000s 31 55.7 74.2 83.9 72.9 2.6 
  Change % -14.8 65.3 118.9 111.3 -6.7 333.3 
Eastern Europe           
  1990s 32.9 80.8 84.8 66.2 62.2 8.3 
  2000s 33.7 70.1 85.3 59.1 77.2 26.5 
  Change % 7.8 3.4 0.4 17.2 27.7 19.8 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
         
  1990s 20.67 65.69 77.49 38.95 44.1 14.46 
  2000s 22.29 67.92 77.82 45.64 56.32 17.32 
  Change % 7.84 3.39 0.43 17.18 27.71 19.78 
South Asia          
  1990s 35.98 20.42 32.23 56.03 46.19 0.3 
  2000s 39.6 32.23 33.47 70.87 61.26 0.7 
  Change % 10.1 57.8 3.8 26.5 32.6 133.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa          
  1990s 29.9 22.3 22.4 45.4 35.7 0.8 
  2000s 31.5 34.3 34.7 58.3 49 1.1 
  Change % 5.4 53.8 54.9 28.4 37.3 37.5 
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Figure (1) the composition of GDP expenditure (%) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Uses and Resources Tables –National Accounts data. 
 
 
2 .2.1 A quick glance at the poverty, inequality and growth trends in Egyptian  
Growth Performance  
Egypt’s growth performance has witnessed a high volatility trend. Figure 2 depicts 
that real GDP growth fluctuates from a declining phase in the latter half of the 1980s 
to an acceleration by 1990, followed by another decline during the period 1999-
2003, to hit the highest levels of economic growth between (2005-2008), and to 
reach 7% just before the 2008 financial crisis. However, the Global Financial Crisis 
curbed Egyptian growth to maintain its rate at 5%.  Meanwhile, inflation accelerated 
to 18.3% annually in August 2008 due to increased commodity prices, a high level 
even for a high inflation country such as Egypt. Unemployment rose from 9.2% in the 
beginning of the 2000s to 11.2% in 2006 to decline during the period of growth until 
the financial crisis (9.4%). By the 25 January Revolution, Egypt's growth witnessed a 
sharp decline, and fell to 1.8% by 2011/12. Recently GDP growth reached 2.2% in 
2012/2103, and the unemployment rate soared to 13.3% in FY2012/2013.  Yet, the 
economic growth rate is lower than the rate of population growth that would entail 
real challenges concerning the poverty and inequality rates after the revolution. 
Similar fluctuations in GDP per capita reveal that Egypt’s economic growth has never 
been sustainable, and the economy was always susceptible to hits by both internal 
and external shocks. GDP per capita growth declined sharply twice in the last 23 
years to reach zero in 2002 and 2011. Nevertheless, GDP per capita growth soared to 
5% during (2005-2008), but declined due to the financial crisis by mid-2008. GDP per 
capita continues its decline through the three years of political transition to be only 
0.07% in 2012. Volatility is not only bad for growth; it is particularly bad for pro-poor 
growth. The poor and middle classes gain less during booms while those who already 
74 73 72 72 72 72 71 72 71 74 77 81 
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Export-Import
Investment&inventory
Government
HH
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 16, No. 1, May 2014 
 
51 
 
have real and financial assets gain most, and the poor and middle classes are the first 
to lose jobs during busts. 
 
Source: WDI 2013   
 
Poverty and inequality trends  
Poverty remains a significant challenge in Egypt. Egypt’s rate of absolute poverty, 
which is defined as the percentage of the population living on less than PPP $1.25 
per day, was 2 percent in 2000, and maintained a steady  rate until 2008, considered  
a better off situation than the 4 percent in 1990, as is shown in table 2. Although the 
incidence of extreme poverty is fairly low, much of Egypt’s population is still poor; 
15% of Egyptians lived on less than $2 PPP per day in 2008, the headcount poverty   
ratio under $2 amounted to 22% in 1990, but sharply declined by the beginning of 
the 2000s. In 1999/2000, the poverty rate, based on the national poverty line, in 
Egypt reached the lowest rate of 16.7%, only to increase during the next sub-periods 
despite the strong economic growth during the period of 2005-2008. Political 
changes made the poverty situation get worse, as it soared to 26.3% of the 
population under the national poverty line for FY 2012/2013 (Egyptian Ministry of 
Planning data). Looking beyond the average in table 3, the period (1990-1995) has 
experienced an increase in the poverty severity measure from 0.14 to 0.44, while the 
poverty headcount declined. This indicates that those closest to the poverty line 
gained benefits from growth while the poorest did not. FY2000 has experienced big 
reductions across all three measures, indicating that the poorest did relatively well 
from growth, unlike FY 2004 where the three measures were worse off. However, in 
FY2008 the headcount declined while P2 increased, indicating that the poor have 
done proportionately better than the poorest in general.  
                               
6 
3 
5 
6 
2.4 
4.5 
7 
2 1.8 
0
1
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8
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2012
Figure 2: GDP growth rate( annual %) 
  
 Real GDP growth rate GDP per capita  growth
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   Table 2- Trends in poverty and inequality  
Indicator 1991 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a 
day (PPP) (% of population) 
4 2 2 2 2 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day 
(PPP) (% of population 
28 
 
26 
 
19 18 15 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2.5 a day 
(PPP) (% of population)  
44 46 37 36 32 
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line  
24.18 19.4 16.7 19.6 22 
GINI index  32 30.1 32.8 32.1 30.8 
Palma Index 1.2601 1.1563 
 
1.3231 1.2787 1.19417 
Source: WDI 2013 
Table 3 -Poverty class measures at $ 1.25 
 Head count poverty Poverty Gap Poverty Gap square 
2008 1.69 0.38 0.39 
2004 1.99 0.39 0.16 
2000 1.18 0.32 0.11 
1995 2.46 0.34 0.44 
1990 4.46 0.60 0.14 
Source:  World Bank Povcal's data  
Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient indicates an overall improvement in 
the distribution of per capita expenditure in Egypt between 2000 and 2008 (down 
from 32.8 to 30.8), which more than offset a slight deterioration between 1996 and 
2000 (up from 30.1 to 32.8). Roughly speaking Gini for the last 25 years has shown a 
moderate trend, moving up or down only about 2 percentage points. Also, inequality 
can be traced by the Palma index, which considers a recent deciles ratio that tackles 
the tails of distribution. Palma is the ratio of income share of the top 10% to the 
poorest 40% of population, it measures the how much the rich earn relative to the 
poor, and the high value of Palma indicates that the poor increased their income 
share or reduced the share of the rich within the followed government's policies. The 
Palma index was about 1.2601 in 1990, and had a sluggish improvement as it 
declined to 1.19417 in 2008. As shown in figure (3) the distribution of consumption 
expenditure by quintile that changes over the five dates (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
2008) have been marginal across all deciles over time. However, over (2000-2008) 
the share of the bottom 20 percent remained almost unchanged, the richest deciles' 
share increased by 1.04 percentage points, while the shares of all other deciles 
increased only marginally. It is worth noting that income distribution during the 5 
waves from (1990-2008) didn’t fluctuate dramatically to cope with the volatility of 
economic growth as was presented in graph (2). 
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Source: Poverty & Equity databank, world bank 
 
2.2.2 The size of the middle class in Egypt  
A recent study by Loayza (2012) points out that when the size of the middle class 
increases, social policy on health and education becomes more active, and the 
quality of governance regarding democratic participation and official corruption 
improves. Following the same vein, Easterly (2001) emphasizes the strong 
association between a solid middle class and higher income, more education, better 
health outcomes and faster upward mobility. However, that wasn't the case of the 
Egyptian middle class as we will reveal in the next points.  
Table (4) presents the main results for the five waves for some relative and absolute 
definitions of MC that were presented earlier in the first section of the study. The 
first remarkable result is that these definitions imply a widely varying size of the MC. 
 On one hand, absolute results, except Homi's ($10-$100), appear to display a stable, 
strong middle class, amounting to a size of almost 85%, whether using Ravallion's or 
ADB thresholds, and maybe a little size shrinking following Ali, A.A.G. (2009) 
methodology (NPL-$13). Notably, these results hide the large bulk of poverty rate 
under the upper thresholds $10, $13, $20 and $100. On the other hand, measures 
based on the relative approach display a glaring heterogeneity. Following Birdsall  
(2007) by excluding the richest decile as the upper line, and $10 as the lower 
threshold, there is no middle class in Egypt. It is worth noting that Birdsall (2007) 
considers $10 to be a minimum secure line for the MC, while Easterly (2001) 
methodology reveals a reasonable average size of the MC as about 40% of the 
population. 
  
 
8.71 
9.51 
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 Figure (3)  Distribution of income or consumption by quintile  
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Table (4)   the Size of Middle Class in Egypt  
survey year  ($13-$2) ($20-$2) ($10- $2) ($13- NPL) ($100-$10) (1.25 m-
0.75m) 
(90th -$10) 
1990 72.09 72.89 70.98 77.25 2.3  38.9 0 
1995 73.81 74.43 72.93 79.62 1.9 42.88 0 
2000 80.24 81.11 79.01 82.26 2.6 41.19 0 
2004 81.1 81.96 79.88 80.06 2.6 41.45 0 
2008 84.17 84.96 83.01 76.78 2.4 43.57 0 
Author's calculation – Povcal data bank. 
2.2.3 The wealth index of middle class in Egypt  
Following Abd-gadir‘s empirical steps  
p = Z    (1 – (Pz /Hz)                                 (1)                       
Where, p is the average expenditure for the poor under (Z) as a poverty line,  
Pz is the poverty gap for the given poverty line, while Hz is the head count ratio for 
the given poverty line. By equation (1) we can produce the average expenditure for 
the poor for both the lower poverty line, p(ZP), and the highest line, p(zm) 
 
The rich average expenditure r can be calculated by the following identity, as the 
average expenditure for the country is already well known. 
 
 
 
                 =       H zm* p(m)           +        (1-H(Zm))  r                              (2) 
  
Where;  is the average income for the society,r is the average expenditure of the 
rich, Hzm is the head count ratio at the upper line, and p(m) is the average income 
of the poor at the upper line  
  
By following the above steps, the country expenditure is divided into three classes 
that can be calculated as 
 
 = H(Zp)p +  M(zp,zm)m + [1-H(zp) -  M(zp,zm)] r                    (3) 
 
The wealth index        = m /  
 
It seems that the middle class in Egypt didn't obtain the proper gains, according to 
the wealth index in table (5). It was much better off in 1990, then it started to slide 
backward since that time, even though it looks as if it is a steady position. The 
average expenditure of the middle class is close to the average expenditure for the 
whole country. That would add another puzzle regarding not only the economic 
position but also the social and political one  
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Table (5 )  Middle class wealth index ($13-NPL) 
Year  Y Yr Ym Yp   
1990 101 258 111.74 42.59 1.11 
1995 98 652 100.34 43.45 1.02 
2000 112 843.4 111.30 46.47 0.99 
2004 113 836.6 112.15 46.23 0.99 
2008 114 932.7 112.00 47.00 0.98 
Author's calculation 
 
 2.2.4  A new proposed measure of the middle class  in Egypt  
The author proposes a new threshold that might reflect the actual picture of MC. 
Consider the median as the lower cutoff while the upper one will exclude the richest 
10% following the Birdsall (2007) upper cutoff as it represents almost 30% of the 
income share of distribution in Egypt.  But first, why use the median?  First; with the 
decline of absolute and extreme poverty, the median would be a reasonable line, as 
it reflects the fact that overall growth is shared with the households. Secondly; the 
growth of the median is close to the growth of the poorest 40% (Birdsall, 2013). 
Finally as table 6 presents, the population size between the NPL and the median is 
considered a large segment, which contradicts the convention wisdom that the 
person who crosses the poverty line can be considered middle class, so subtracting 
the bulk of population under the median line can capture the actual story of the 
middle class.  Even Ravallion's upper threshold a $13 is very high line in the Egyptian 
case; almost 99% of the population under this line is poor which is considered an 
unrealistic line to the author, even if it is the western poverty line. Unlike the 
absolute measure, which showed a stable and strong middle class size in Egypt for 
the five waves, the middle class according to the new thresholds have shrunk during 
the period of high economic growth and decreasing inequality. Additionally, it 
shrinks from almost 40% to 35% in a period which is highly pro-poor growth as we 
will illustrate in the next section. That might be a string to explain the dissatisfaction   
in the years of booming growth. 
 
 
Table (6)   the size of middle class using the median approach 
survey year  (m-NPL) ($13-m) (90th-m) 
1990 28.72 48.53 39.72 
1995 30.72 48.9 39.88 
2000 34.07 48.19 39.53 
2004 31.84 48.22 39.56 
2008 33 43.78 35 
Author's calculation  
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Section Three:  Pro-Poor Growth in Egypt  
Was growth pro-poor in Egypt? In the previous section the volatility of economic 
performance was glaring; the contradiction of the size of the middle class under 
different thresholds may be adding complexity to the vague picture. However, in 
recent years, a central topic in the economic development literature has been the 
measurement of the distributive impact of growth. Although there is a growing 
consensus in the literature that sustained and rapid economic growth translates into 
poverty reduction, there is a wide disparity in the extent of poverty reduction that a 
growth process can achieve. The supposed fact is that achieving pro-poor growth 
would lead to a poverty decrease, then a larger middle class size. But, was that the 
actual path in the Egyptian case?   The next section will demonstrate the different 
approaches of defining Pro-poor growth, then the indices of pro-poor growth from 
the grouped data. 
3.1 Definitions of pro-poor growth 
Defining pro poor growth is a debated subject; generally speaking pro-poor growth is 
economic growth that is favorable to the poor. But, the term favorable differs from 
one view to another. While one view focuses on the poverty reductions in absolute 
terms, another alternative concentrates on distributional changes. Another 
alternative proposes a non-income dimension of pro-poor growth that had to be 
considered beside the income gains of growth of the non-income view. The next 
section will reveal the main distinctive approaches to defining pro-poor growth. Each 
one of these views has its own merits and limitations. 
3-1.1 The relative definition group: 
The relative definition of pro-poor growth compares changes in the incomes of the 
poor with respect to changes in the incomes of the non-poor. Using this definition, 
growth is pro-poor when the distributional shifts accompanying growth favor the 
poor. According to McCulloch and Baulch (1999), whenever poverty bias of growth it 
must be a pro-poor, they compare the actual income distribution with one that 
would be obtained in the case of distribution-neutral growth, and propose a 
measure of pro-poor growth known as the poverty bias of growth (PBG).  
Nevertheless, the higher values of the PBG may not imply a greater reduction in 
poverty because poverty also depends on the growth effect. In an attempt to 
capture the degree of pro-poor growth, Kakwani and Pernia’s (2000) study "what is 
pro-poor" represents a major departure from the "trickle-down" phenomenon that 
was dominant in the 1950s and 1960s, which implied a vertical flow from the rich to 
the poor, where the benefits of economic growth go to the rich first, while in the 
second round the poor begin to benefit when the rich start spending their gains. 
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Kakwani and Pernia (2000) proposed a new indicator—the pro-poor growth index—
that measures the degree to which growth can be deemed pro-poor. Kakwani 
followed the work of the pro-poor growth index (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000) which 
has captured the distribution of growth benefits among the poor and non-poor, but 
it does not take into account the level of the actual growth rate. In response to this 
Kawani and Son (2003), proposed the PEGR (Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate), 
defined as the growth rate that will result in the same level of poverty reduction if 
the growth process had not been accompanied by any change in inequality 
(everyone get the same proportional benefits of growth), which takes into account 
not only the magnitude of growth, but also how much the benefits of growth are 
distributed between the poor and non-poor. For K&S the word “pro-poor” literally 
means that the poor should receive more but not less benefits than the non-poor.  
3.1.2 The absolute definition group 
The second prevailing definition is the absolute definition, which focuses on what 
happens to poverty. Growth is considered to be pro-poor if and only if poor people 
benefit in absolute terms, as reflected in some agreed upon measure of poverty. 
Consistent with this approach is the work of both Ravallion and Chen (2003) & Kraay 
(2004), which is based on changes in both the rate of growth and the distribution of 
gains. On one hand, the absolute approach emphasizes the proportional gains of the 
poor using poverty elasticity, while on the other hand, it is hard to discern whether a 
particular elasticity actually implies that the poor have benefited disproportionately 
or not. In Dollar and Kraay’s (2000) study "growth is good for the poor," they 
proposed the link between the average income and the average income of the 
poorest quintile, and the poor were defined as those in the bottom of the income 
distribution of a country. D&K came to the conclusion that the growth incomes of 
the poor tracked average income roughly one-to-one, which  means that elasticity of 
the income of the poor relative to mean income is statistically indistinguishably from 
unity . 
Ravallion and Chen’s (2003) study, which focused on what happen to poverty instead 
of focusing on the distributional shifts during the growth process, came out with the 
view that pro-poor growth is the growth that reduces poverty. The extent to which 
growth is pro-poor depends on how much the chosen measure of poverty changes, 
in that case, what happens to the distribution changes only a part with addition to 
what happens to the average living standard. From the inception of Ravallion and 
Chen (2003), and building on Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kraay (2004) took a deeper 
step by adopting a broader definition and then applied a standard poverty 
decomposing technique to identify three potential sources of pro-poor growth: (a) a 
high growth rate of average incomes; (b) a high sensitivity of poverty to growth in 
average incomes; and (c) a poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes.  
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3.1.3 Non-income dimension of pro-poor growth   
Growth that is declared to be pro-poor where the measure is based only on income 
must not automatically imply improvement in the non-income (or social) dimension 
of poverty. (Klasen, 2005) clarifies the non-monetary dimension of pro-poor growth 
by investigating the missing gap in the literature on pro-poor growth where the 
income dimension is supreme. Consistent with Klasen’s view (2004) that the income 
dimension is not sufficient, Osmani (2005) argues that pinning the definition of pro-
poor growth exclusively on distributional impact adds nothing to the traditional 
concern with equitable growth that can be traced back at least to Chenery et al. 
(1974). Osmani took a further step to the need to clarify the quality of pro-poorness, 
taking into account the distinction between the rate and the nature of the growth. 
Osmani's view of pro-poor growth is a combination of Ravallion and Kakwani 
approaches, suggesting that the concept of PPG must refer to the absolute 
magnitude of poverty reduction, yet contain an element of bias in favor of the poor. 
So a critical question that must be raised is how is this bias defined? This entails 
identifying a benchmark to gauge the pro-poorness of growth. 
3.2   Measuring Pro-Poor Growth  
Methodology and data  
The research relies on an empirical tool that uses Distributive Analysis SATA Package 
DASP, which provide the results of three main indices of PPG. The method 
introduces complementary and consistently measures of PPG with the Growth 
Incidence Curve (GIC) from the Household survey. Taking into consideration that the 
author is not authorized to use the Household surveys due to Egyptian government 
restrictions, the author used grouped data from the Povcal data bank to calculate 
the indices. 
  
Data 
World Development Indicators  GDP, GDP per capita, Population 
Povcal data  Po,P1,P2, income shares , Gini coefficient, 
Lorenz curve data 
  
The study can be a complementary work regarding the measurements of PPG, as it 
develops the measures of PPG that uses the grouped data of World Bank Povcal 
data. The study differs from the work of  El-Laithy et al. (2011) or (2008), the first 
(2011) covers only the period (2005-2008) based on the Household Income, 
Expenditure and Consumption Panel Survey conducted by Egypt’s national statistical 
agency, as data is easily available. The study of El-Laithy compares Growth Incidence 
Curves (GIC) based on a cross section of data with GICs based on the panel data ,and 
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how its results may contradict depending on whether the mobility factors were up 
and down. The research of this study covers the five waves (1990-2008) using both 
the grouped Povcal data.  
3.2.1 Measuring PPG from grouped data (DASP)  
In this section the research presents the three main indices of PPG using DASP 
program. A Brief review of indices is presented in Appendix 1. 
Table 7 presents the indices at the poverty line of $38 and the poverty measure 
of Ho where α =0. During the period (1990-1995) growth was pro-poor for only 
two indices except for K&S (2000). The period was marked by stabilization 
program and price liberalization, particularly in agriculture. This was 
accompanied by a significant decline in all poverty measures except the poverty 
gap square. Also, in spite of the decline in Gini as an inequality measure, the 
Household final consumption expenditure annual growth declines to reach 
2.44% in 1995 from 3.7% in 1990, according to WDR (2013), which means that 
the poorest people didn't benefit from economic reform. That is the only 
explanation to K&S 2000 index of anti-pro-poor growth. Moving from 1995 to 
2005, growth was anti-pro-poor for the two sub-periods. It has witnessed a 
reversal of the pattern of expenditure distribution, with an increase in poverty 
measures. Inequality (GINI) increased by two percentage points. Unlike the 
period (2004-2008), growth was pro-poor. This means that GDP growth is still 
the main trigger for reducing poverty and inequality in Egypt. 
Table (7) Pro-poor growth indices (1990-2008)        Poverty line =38               = 0 
Indices Estimate 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2004 -2008 
)Growth Rate(g -0.030135         0.146668         0.002852         0.013421 
Ravallion & Chen (2003) 
index 
0.116517         0.043268         -0.018977         0.022711 
Ravallion & Chen (2003) 
 - g 
0.146652         -0.103400         -0.021829         0.009290 
 Pro-poor  Anti-poor 
poor  
Anti-poor poor Pro-poor 
Kakwani & Pernia (2000) 
index 
-3.142857               0.500000    
     
-34665648.393 3.000000 
 Anti- 
Pro- poor 
Moderate -
poor poor 
Anti- 
Po-poor 
High 
Pro-poor 
PEGR index 0.094709         0.073334         -98877.090693     0.040263 
PEGR – g 0.124844             -0.073334    
     
   -98877.093545     0.026842 
 Pro- poor Anti-poor 
poor 
Anti- 
Pro- poor 
Pro- poor 
Author's calculations  
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Table (8) Pro-poor growth indices (1990-2008)        Poverty line =60              = 0 
Indices Estimate 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2004 -2008 
)Growth Rate(g -0.030135 0.146668         0.002852         0.013421         
Ravallion & Chen (2003) 
index 
0.058390 0.063223         0.000540         0.035797         
Ravallion & Chen (2003) – g 0.088525 -0.083445         -0.002312         0.022376         
 Pro-poor Anti- 
pro-poor 
Anti- 
pro-poor 
Pro-poor 
Kakwani & Pernia (2000) 
index 
-0.250000 0.650000         3.500001         3.333333         
 Anti-pro-poor  Moderate -
pro-poor 
High 
Pro-poor  
 High  
Pro-poor 
PEGR index 0.034897 0.007027         0.005987        0.012582         
PEGR – g 0.035940 0.007571        0.005987        0.012534         
 Pro-poor Pro-poor  Pro-poor Pro-poor 
Author's calculations  
Conclusion    
The study has reviewed some of the most frequently used income-based definitions 
of middle class in the empirical literature. The analysis of the way in which the 
middle class has evolved over time requires a measure that is sensitive to changes in 
the income distribution. The empirical results for the absolute-thresholds definition 
indicate that the size of the middle class in Egypt has been increasing over the last 
two decades. While the relative-thresholds definition may have another trend, it 
indicates that the size of the MC is not bulging. The researcher proposes a threshold 
based on the median as a lower threshold, as the size of population who lies 
between the national poverty line and median is about 33% of the population, those 
who are conventionally called middle class. The study also presents the wealth index 
of the middle class in Egypt, which emphasizes the strong stable middle class 
households' expenditure level, noting that the index used absolute income-based 
thresholds. The evidence presented in this study suggests that definitions of the 
middle class based on sound principles of distributional analysis are most needed 
beside the income-based definitions. 
The paper has proposed an empirical test to test whether distributional changes are 
pro-poor  in Egypt during the period time (1990-2008) using the three main indices. 
It shows that Egypt's growth was pro-poor in two sub-periods. Egypt has achieved a 
reasonable poverty reduction according to international standards during the growth 
booming period; inequality also was moderate by global standards. However, 
despite the fluctuation, if Egypt's economic growth was achieving pro-poor growth 
during the study time, the middle class in Egypt shows a stable pattern in size.  That 
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would entail a deep further study of income and social mobility of this class to 
monitor the real evolution of this class from other aspects rather than the income-
based threshold, especially after the political changes that swept the Arab region.  
Inevitably, an in-depth analysis of the characteristics and vulnerability of the middle 
class and its relevance as an engine for economic development are substantially 
needed. 
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Appendix: 
1- Ravallion and Chen index (2003) 
  
 
Index =   W1(z)-W2(z)/ F1(z) 
 
Where WD is the Watts index for the distribution D 1, 2, F1(z)is the headcount 
poverty for index of the initial distribution . Which means if the index –g is positive, 
then this period is pro-poor growth as it presents in table 6and 7. 
 
2-   PEGR Index: Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003) 
 
Index =            (        
  ( 
        )         
     
(  (
  
  
)         )                
                )  
 
 
If this exceeds the growth rate g, the actual growth rate, the growth is judged pro-
poor (with the relative statement). 
 
3- The Kakwani and Pernia pro‐poor index (2000): 
 
Kakwani and Pernia consider that growth is pro-poor when the poor receive the 
benefits of growth proportionately than the non-poor. PPGI   shows the ratio of 
elasticity for total poverty reduction in case of distribution neutral growth. This ratio 
will be greater than one when growth is pro-poor. 
